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The relations between Russia’s authorities and business circles are subordinated not so 
much to rational economic calculations as to the interests of political elites. The key inte-
rest in this case is maintaining the current model of government. The formal and informal 
supervision of business by law enforcement agencies is an important element of Russia’s 
economic reality. Despite the rhetoric of high-ranking officials, intended to suggest that the 
state is taking care of businesspeople’s interests, it is evident that there is no will to devise 
a systemic solution to the most urgent problems, including the state institutions’ disrespect 
for the rights of ownership.
This policy has not substantially changed since the outbreak of the economic crisis in 2014. 
It should be expected that repressive measures will continue to be applied towards busi-
nesspeople, while at the same time attempts at neutralising business circles’ dissatisfaction 
will be made by establishing sham channels of communication with the authorities. In order 
to appease business groups, a working group on the dialogue between business and the 
authorities was established at the initiative of President Vladimir Putin in February 2016. 
This step is unlikely to improve the situation of entrepreneurs; moreover, it can be viewed 
as another example of the dysfunction of the Russian model of governance, of the ever-pre-
sent ‘manual control’, and of the authorities’ lack of interest in taking effective measures to 
actually improve conditions for doing business.
The place of business in the Russian 
state model
In Russia, the relationship between the authori-
ties and business circles is one element of a gen-
eral model of relations between the authorities 
and society. This model involves the absolute 
primacy of interests of political and bureaucrat-
ic elites at federal and local level over the inter-
ests and rights of citizens. A complex appara-
tus of control and repression, based mainly on 
prosecution bodies and the institutions of the 
judiciary, guarantees that these interests can be 
successfully pursued.
The Kremlin’s policy towards business (as pur-
sued since 2003, and symbolised by the Yu-
kos case, which involved depriving Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky of his assets in revenge for his 
political ambitions) has involved, on the one 
hand, treating private property as a relative 
concept, and on the other, complicating the 
regulations governing the activity of business-
es in such a way that the state administration 
bodies effectively curb their economic freedom 
by organising monitoring and supervision. The 
declared goal in this case is to increase the 
state’s revenues and track down illegal activi-
ties. Economic success is possible only when it 
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is approved by the state’s bodies. One exam-
ple is the complicated system of licences which 
administrative bodies issue for conducting eco-
nomic activity: 19 federal institutions have been 
authorised to issue licences for specific types of 
economic activity, and the lengthy process of 
issuing licences is often a source of corruption1.
Contrary to the rhetoric of top officials, which 
is intended to suggest that the state takes 
care of the interests of entrepreneurs, recog-
nizes their role in the economy and is ready to 
create a business-friendly climate2, statistics 
indicate that there is no will to devise a sys-
temic solution to the most urgent problems. 
The most severe problems include disrespect 
for the right to own private property3, abuse of 
criminal law provisions in investigations focus-
ing on businesspeople, arbitrary actions by con-
1 These include the Federal Security Service, the Ministry 
of the Interior (and its departments for migration ser-
vice and combating drug trafficking), the Ministry of 
Emergency Situations, the Federal Service for Technical 
and Export Control, the Federal Tax Service, the Federal 
Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision Service, the 
Federal Service for Healthcare Supervision and similar 
supervision services focusing on other spheres of life, as 
well as the Ministry of Culture.
2 For example, this rhetoric has been used by President 
Vladimir Putin. He devoted a large portion of his annual 
address to the nation in December 2015 to the situa-
tion of business (see http://kremlin.ru/events/president/
news/50864, 3 December 2015).
3 The demolition of shopping and service facilities in Mos-
cow on the night of 8/9 February 2016 received much at-
tention. The reason for their destruction was that allegedly 
they had been built without permission. In all, 97 facilities 
were demolished with no previous attempts at clarifying 
the situation. This was done despite the fact that owners 
of at least half of the shops held complete documentation 
confirming that the structures had been legally built and 
that the ownership rights had been formally recognised by 
the relevant courts. The incident happened two months 
after the President’s public appeal to respect the rights 
of entrepreneurs; http://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/56c-
d690e9a794783fc5559be, 24 February 2016.
trol and prosecution bodies, as well as the parti-
ality of courts which frequently manipulate the 
course of the proceedings, as a consequence of 
which businesspeople increasingly often lose 
cases brought against them by the authorities4. 
The practice of resolving civil law disputes using 
criminal law provisions is widespread, for ex-
ample in cases involving fraud5. Using arrest as 
a preventive measure is also common. Between 
2012 and mid-2015 the number of individuals 
on remand charged with economic crimes rose 
from 3840 to 61836; and the number of criminal 
cases opened on the basis of economic crime 
charges rose by 22% in 2015, which is explained 
by a simplification of the procedures to initiate 
such cases7. The proportion of acquittals in cas-
es involving economic crimes remains extreme-
ly low (below 1%), and at the same time very 
few businesspeople are subject to amnesty8. 
Over 70% of entrepreneurs claim that the level 
of risk associated with doing business has risen 
over the last three years (i.e. during President 
Vladimir Putin’s third term)9.
Representatives of business circles also point 
to deteriorating conditions for doing business, 
caused by frequent amendments to tax laws, 
the actions of supervisory bodies which inter-
pret legal provisions arbitrarily, increased re-
porting obligations, and discrimination during 
public tenders against specific companies10.
4 http: //www.rbc.ru/politics /20/10/2015/5624fe6d-
9a794775dd228787, 20 October 2015.
5 See the letter from Boris Titov, the ombudsman for entre-
preneurs’ rights, to Andrei Belousov, the President’s ad-
viser: ombudsmanbiz.ru/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/
Белоусову.pdf, 15 September 2015.
6 Figures compiled by the Supreme Court of the Russian Fed-
eration; http://www.rbc.ru/economics/16/02/2016/56c356f-
f9a794756f30a2aba, 16 February 2016.
7 http://www.oilru.com/news/507574/%, 23 March 2016
8 http://xakas.info/news/46354; http://www.dp.ru/a/2015/04 
/24/Amnistija_ne_zahvativaet_p/, 24 April 2015; http://www. 
novayagazeta.ru/politics/70380.html, 19 October 2015.
9 A 2016 PwC survey conducted among executives of the 
biggest businesses; see http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/2902156, 28 January 2016
10 Statements by representatives of business circles deliv-
ered at a meeting with Vladimir Putin during a meeting 
of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry on 1 March 
2016, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51413
The repressive and non-transparent law 
is accompanied by its arbitrary applica-
tion, systemic corruption and a lack of 
court independence.
3OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 212
The repressive and at the same time non-trans-
parent nature of the law and its frequent 
amendments are accompanied by the arbitrary 
application of specific provisions by state insti-
tutions, widespread systemic corruption11 and 
a lack of court independence.Corruption – 
which is present in all spheres of life, from big 
contracts awarded in public tenders, through 
education and health care, to everyday con-
tacts between citizens and public servants – is 
causing immense losses for the state and for 
business (estimated at several hundred bil-
lion US dollars annually12). In the Corruption 
Perceptions Index published by Transparen-
cy International, Russia has repeatedly been 
ranked far outside the top one hundred states 
covered by the survey (in 2015 it was ranked 
119th out of 168 states, which suggests 
slight progress compared with 2014, when it 
was ranked 136th out of 175 states). Russia’s 
courts, for their part, are not so much a sep-
arate power as a tool used by prosecution 
bodies and civil offices, including the Kremlin, 
to crush political and business opponents13. 
All this creates a situation of permanent un-
certainty in relations between entrepreneurs 
11 http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table
12 http://vz.ru/economy/2009/11/17/349632.html, 17 Novem-
ber 2009; http://pasmi.ru/archive/127691, 25 August 2015.
13 The most-publicised cases of politicisation of courts in-
clude the 2003 Yukos case, the sentences for the partic-
ipants in anti-Putin rallies on Bolotnaya Square in May 
2012 and the trial of Nadiya Savchenko (September 2015 
– March 2016). The mechanisms by which the Kremlin 
puts pressure on courts were exposed for the first time 
in 2008 by one of the top officials of the judiciary; http://
www.kommersant.ru/doc/891082, 13 May 2008.
and the state, makes these relations feel like 
a ‘game with no rules’, and evokes fear of un-
justified repressions.
The small- and medium-sized enterprise sector, 
which generates approximately 21% of Russia’s 
GDP and is dominated by individual entrepre-
neurs, is particularly defenceless against the 
state apparatus14. In the case of big businesses 
(such as raw material companies, large private 
banks and the biggest trade and service com-
panies), their relations with the state admin-
istration are mainly based on private contacts 
with political decision-makers and on individual 
channels of communication15.
The special role of law enforcement 
agencies in relations between the state 
and business
Formal and informal supervision of business by 
the law enforcement agencies responsible for 
the state’s internal security (the so-called silovi-
ki) is an important element of Russian econom-
ic reality. These agencies are commonly used by 
the authorities as a tool to exert control over so-
ciety. In the context of the state’s relations with 
entrepreneurs they perform additional, non-po-
litical tasks which involve ensuring a permanent 
supply of ‘corruption income’, illegal profits 
from extortion and protection money obtained 
by representatives of inspection bodies, prose-
cution bodies and institutions of the judiciary, 
as well as public servants at all levels. Inquiries 
and investigations carried out against various 
categories of entrepreneurs are frequently used 
as a pretext for legalising ‘hostile takeovers’ by 
companies sponsored by state institutions. Out 
14 http://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2015/09/24 
/609990-obyazatelnih-postavschikov, 24 September 2015.
15 Businessmen who have been associated with Vladimir 
Putin for years, and who have direct access to him, are in 
the most favourable situation. These include Igor Sechin, 
Yuri Kovalchuk, Gennady Timchenko and the brothers 
Arkady and Boris Rotenberg. They have enjoyed wide 
support from the Russian state, in particular since 2014, 
when they were covered by Western sanctions.
The formal and informal supervision of 
business by institutions responsible for 
the state’s internal security (so-called 
siloviki) is an important element of Rus-
sian economic reality.
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of 200,000 investigations launched against en-
trepreneurs in 2014, only 46,000 were brought 
to the courts (which suggests that most in-
vestigations were launched without sufficient 
evidence), although 83% entrepreneurs lost 
their companies as a result of investigators’ 
actions16. This prompts a conclusion that the 
prosecution bodies’ real goal was to take over 
the companies’ assets17. Frequently, individu-
als commit the alleged offences because they 
were prompted by provocative actions taken by 
public servants18. Equally important is the pro-
cess of formally expanding the competences 
of law enforcement structures in the economic 
sphere, as evidenced for example by the act of 
granting prosecution bodies the right in 2014 
to launch tax-related investigations without the 
participation of fiscal administration bodies.
Supervisory and repressive measures are fre-
quently carried out in a selective and arbitrary 
manner which additionally complicates the sit-
uation for entrepreneurs. The competences of 
law enforcement agencies in the field of the su-
pervision of business and combating economic 
16 Vladimir Putin mentioned this in his address to the Na-
tional Assembly in December 2015, when he criticised 
the over-frequent use of arrest as a preventive measure 
in investigations; http://kremlin.ru/events/president/
news/50864, 3 December 2015.
17 More than 60% of entrepreneurs complain that criminal 
investigations are commonly used as a means of taking 
over assets. See the letter by Boris Titov, ombudsman 
for entrepreneurs’ rights to Andrei Belousov, the Pres-
ident’s adviser, of 15 September 2015, ombudsmanbiz.
ru/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Белоусову.pdf
18 http://www.rbc.ru/economics/11/12/2014/54884aac-
cbb20f731c43a21c, 11 December 2014.
crime overlap; this means that conflicts arise 
which expose the informal relations operating 
within the economy. Moreover, criminal cases 
focusing on entrepreneurship are frequently 
the result of powerplays at the local level. The 
actions taken by regional authorities, including 
the lower structures of Federal Security Service 
(FSB) and the Ministry of the Interior, do not 
form a clear pattern at the national level.
The economic crisis: relaxing 
or tightening the rules of the game?
The operation of the above-mentioned mecha-
nisms of relations between the authorities and 
business is becoming ever more complicated in 
the context of the economic crisis. The situation 
of business circles is deteriorating, in particular 
that of small- and medium-sized companies op-
erating mainly in the trade and service sector, 
which have been the most affected by the cri-
sis19. At the same time, spending cuts provoked 
by the recession have forced state administra-
tion bodies to increase their control and super-
vision activity, which is frequently unjustified, 
in order to justify the costs of their own exist-
ence. Entrepreneurs find it increasingly difficult 
to accept all the formal, legal financial bur-
dens, not to mention the illegal levies (bribes, 
ransom money)20. It is becoming increasingly 
difficult to obtain illegal income from busi-
nesspeople, and hence the dysfunction of the 
current model of coexistence between business 
circles and the authorities is growing. Compe-
19 http://www.garant.ru/article/602378/#ixzz41xi7ghz3, 
21 January 2015. Decreased consumer demand caused 
a 10% drop in retail turnover in 2015 as compared with 
2014, and the consumers’ saving strategy has a negative 
impact on the service sector in particular.
20 According to experts, the actual tax rate applicable to 
businesses in Russia, after summing up all tax and pa-
ra-tax burdens, is 65–70%; http://www.survey-invest.
com/nikolay_ostarkov__nalogovaya_nagruzka_na_bi-
znes___70__/, 21 January 2014. Plans have been made 
to increase para-tax burdens in order to save the state’s 
finances; http://www.rbc.ru/economics/04/03/2016/
56d9a5d29a7947b0897de24a, 4 March 2016.
In the situation of the economic crisis, 
competition for the division of resources 
is becoming ever tougher, resulting in an 
escalation of conflicts in the relations be-
tween entrepreneurs and state adminis-
tration bodies.
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tition for the division of resources is becom-
ing ever tougher, resulting in an escalation of 
conflicts in relations between entrepreneurs 
and state administration bodies. In this situa-
tion, entrepreneurs seem to be becoming ever 
more desperate in their appeals to the author-
ities. This is becoming more and more impor-
tant in the context of upcoming elections (the 
parliamentary elections in September 2016 
and the presidential election in March 2018).
Fearing that dissatisfaction in business circles 
may increase, the authorities cannot openly 
ignore the repeated complaints from entre-
preneurs. However, to a large extent, gestures 
made towards them are purely formal conces-
sions instead of systemic solutions to the prob-
lems. Examples of this include the Kremlin’s 
initiative of establishing the ‘Party of Growth’, 
led by Boris Titov, the ombudsman for entre-
preneurs’ rights21, as well as the nature of most 
of the ‘pro-business’ amendments to the law 
adopted in 2014. These amendments were ac-
companied by the simultaneous tightening of 
certain regulations. Although small business 
was relieved from planned controls until the 
end of 2018, no limitations concerning ad hoc 
controls  were introduced. Only around 15% 
of individual entrepreneurs are entitled to the 
three-year ‘tax holiday’, which in addition is de-
21 The party’s platform is to refer to the idea of defence 
of entrepreneurs’ rights, which most likely is intended 
to channel the potential of dissatisfaction within busi-
ness circles as part of political activity supervised by 
the Kremlin. In particular, it is intended to block any 
attempts at forming an alliance of businesspeople and 
anti-Kremlin liberal movements.
pendent on the goodwill of regional authori-
ties, who are directly interested in maximising 
the income to their local budgets. The pres-
idential ban on tax increases until the end of 
2018  only apply to taxes regulated in federal 
law. Non-tax burdens have been on the rise, 
and the amounts of numerous administrative 
fines have been increased22.
Despite the mounting economic problems, so 
far no actions have been taken which could 
serve as a warning sign to law enforcement 
agencies to substantially reduce their control 
and their repressive measures targeted at en-
trepreneurs. The competition for control over 
financial flows is becoming ever tougher, which 
results in the excessive activity of law enforce-
ment agencies in their relations with business. 
It also encourages the Kremlin to take measures 
to centralise the ‘management’ of the relations 
between entrepreneurs and state security insti-
tutions. This is probably intended merely to or-
ganise the mechanisms of formal and informal 
control over business, instead of relaxing them, 
and to make them ever more dependent on the 
vertical model of state administration in the 
context of the economic crisis and upcoming 
elections. This is probably the role which the 
working group for dialogue between business 
and law enforcement agencies, established in 
mid-February 2016 by President Vladimir Putin, 
is intended to play.
Institutionalisation of the dialogue 
between business and the ‘siloviki’:  
breakthrough or shadow-boxing?
It is likely that the President took the ad hoc 
decision to form the above-mentioned work-
ing group (officially called a working group on 
monitoring and analysis of law enforcement 
practice in the field of entrepreneurship) in the 
22 http://www.garant.ru/article/602378/#ixzz41xi7ghz3, 
21 January 2015.
Despite growing economic problems, no 
actions have so far been taken to actual-
ly reduce the supervisory and repressive 
measures performed by law enforcement 
structures on entrepreneurs.
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aftermath of his meeting with the head of one 
of Russia’s organisations grouping business-
people, and in reaction to the catalogue of 
problems then presented to Putin23. Although 
the decision to form the group can be viewed 
as a gesture towards entrepreneurs (the group 
is led by Sergei Ivanov, the head of the Presi-
dent’s Office, and the President himself presid-
ed over the group’s first meeting on 23 March 
2016), much suggests that this is intended to be 
a tool to discipline businesspeople rather than 
a real platform for dialogue and defence of 
their interests.
The official communiqué regarding the group’s 
establishment states that the group’s task would 
be to analyse legal provisions which, in the 
opinion of representatives of entrepreneurs, in 
effect hinder doing business. The group’s com-
position is noteworthy: on the entrepreneurs’ 
side the talks are to be conducted by four main 
organisations grouping businesspeople24, while 
on the authorities’ side the group includes  rep-
resentatives of the General Public Prosecutor’s 
Office, the Investigative Committee, the Minis-
try of the Interior and the FSB (as well as Ivanov 
himself, who is associated with the law enforce-
ment structures and has played the role of an 
informal coordinator of contacts between the 
law enforcement agencies and the Kremlin). 
The group does not include representatives of 
the parliament or the ‘civil’ ministries responsi-
ble for preparing laws; nor does it include rep-
resentatives of the fiscal control bodies or the 
judiciary, who play a crucial role in shaping the 
relations between the state and business. The 
group’s meetings are planned to take place at 
least quarterly, which can hardly be interpreted 
as a declaration of intensive work.
23 On 15 February, a meeting took place between Presi-
dent Putin and Alexander Shokhin, president of the Rus-
sian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs.
24 The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, 
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Delovaya Ros-
siya and Opora Rossii.
The group’s first meeting in March 2016 was 
devoted to a general discussion of demands 
voiced by entrepreneurs regarding most of the 
desired amendments to the laws. The Kremlin 
was well acquainted with these demands, as 
they have been repeatedly presented, but have 
so far not been met25. The initial result of this 
discussion was that in May 2016 the President 
submitted to the State Duma a package of two 
bills which partly satisfy the entrepreneurs’ 
demands. This means that formally, some pro-
gress has been made compared with the cur-
rent state of affairs26. Regardless of the final 
wording and the scope of the amendments, 
the main problem, in the context of common 
practice observed in Russia so far, will involve 
the implementation of the amended provisions: 
they are likely to be resisted by both the prose-
cution bodies and the courts.
At the same time, the Kremlin refuses to dis-
cuss specific cases of the ‘siloviki’s’ abuse of 
power towards business circles, thereby re-
fusing to focus on the key problem involving 
the practice of interpreting and applying the 
law. This suggests that the ostensible appre-
ciation of businesspeople as partners in the 
discussions with the authorities is intended to 
conceal the real nature of the group as anoth-
er channel for discussing primarily technical 
25 Including limiting the period for which prosecution bod-
ies are allowed to keep material evidence in investigations 
against entrepreneurs, allowing notaries public to work in 
prisons, introducing different categories of penal measures 
depending on the behaviour of the accused and the scale of 
offences, and reducing the scope of application of criminal 
law provisions in cases involving business fraud.
26 The bills slightly expand the category of business of-
fences in which no criminal investigation should be 
launched; propose less strict regulations regarding 
individuals who engage in business fraud for the first 
time; and meet the demand to allow notaries public to 
speak with businesspeople under arrest. At the same 
time, penal measures for economic crimes catego-
rised as fraud were significantly stepped up. This will 
have a negative impact on entrepreneurs, for example 
because it is common for prosecution bodies to apply 
this category of crime. 26 May 2016, http://www.rbc.ru/ 
economics/26/05/2016/5746d8f09a79470115e2de52; 
27.05.2016, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2997127
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issues (such as minor amendments to laws), 
rather than analysing the nature of specif-
ic systemic pathologies (arbitrary actions by 
specific services, cases of abuse, common in-
fringement upon citizens’ rights) which it is 
practically impossible to eliminate in the pres-
ent Russian state model. At the same time, the 
fact that this body was formed is clear proof 
of the dysfunction of the Russian state and of 
the current institutions established to defend 
entrepreneurs’ rights (principally like the office 
of the ombudsman of entrepreneurs’ rights). 
It is also proof that Vladimir Putin’s ‘manual 
control’ of the state is strengthening.
